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I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a long established principle that “the law”— judicial
opinions, statutes, and administrative regulations—is not copyrightable.
This may seem like an intuitive principle or an obvious requirement in
a society committed to democracy and the rule of law: if citizens are to
1

J.D. Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2017; M.L.I.S., St. Catherine
University, 2011; B.A. English, Macalester College, 2005. The author wishes to thank
Minnesota's law and special librarian communities for furthering her interest in copyright
law and for supporting her librarian-to-lawyer career change. The author also wishes to
thank her family, especially Nick, for his daily supply of encouragement, cooking, and
romantic walks with the dogg.
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participate in creating law through democratic systems, they must be
informed about the law. Furthermore, due process of law dictates that
those subject to the rule of law must have access to the law if they are
to be held responsible for complying with it.2
However, the uncopyrightable nature of the law has been
challenged many times in copyright infringement lawsuits. Even after
many cases addressing the issue, the boundaries between what
constitutes the law and is, therefore, uncopyrightable, and what is
additional and, therefore, copyrightable, is not always clear. These
issues are exacerbated by the history of legal publishing: various
branches of the federal government and state governments have relied
on private entities to publish public domain material.3 This created, and
continues to create, a clash of interests between those private entities,
who desire copyright protection for their works, and the public, who
need access to the law that governs them.
Currently, the state of Georgia is suing a non-profit,
Public.Resource.org,4 for copyright infringement because the
organization published an annotated version of the state’s code on its
website.5 Public.Resource.org is arguing that since the annotated
version is the state’s “official code,” the entirety of that code is the law
and cannot be copyrighted.6 The issues are further complicated by a
2

One scholar sees additional constitutional problems at the intersection of the
government and copyright in allowing the copyrighting of works that were commissioned
and funded by the government. See generally Andrea Simon, A Constitutional Analysis of
Copyrighting Government-Commissioned Work, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 425 (1984).
3
See Sarah Glassmeyer, State Legal Information Census: An Analysis of Primary State
Legal Information, 23–27 (2016),
http://www.sarahglassmeyer.com/StateLegalInformation/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/GlassmeyerStateLegalInformationCensusReport.pdf (surveying
publication of official state codes and court reporters by private entities and noting the
frequent reliance on private entities for official publications).
4
See About Us, PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, https://public.resource.org/about/index.html
(last visited May 14, 2016); Bylaws of Public.Resource.Org, Inc.,
PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG § 2.1, https://public.resource.org/public.resource.bylaws.html
(last visited May 14, 2016) (“The objectives and purposes of Public.Resource.Org, Inc.
shall be: to create, architect, design, implement, operate and maintain public works
projects on the Internet for Educational, Charitable, and Scientific Purposes to the benefit
of the general public and the public interest . . . .”).
5
Compl. at 2, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No.
1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. July 21, 2015).
6
Answer at 24, 27, 28, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No.
1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 9, 2015); see also Bill Donahue, Nonprofit Group Says
Georgia Code Can’t Be Copyrighted, LAW360 (Sept. 15, 2015, 4:56 PM),
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private entity, LexisNexis (not currently a party to the lawsuit), that
publishes and creates the annotations in the official code.7
This Note will begin by surveying the history of the principle
that the law is not copyrightable by looking at copyright of statutes and
judicial opinions,8 copyright of material supplementing the text of the
law,9 and, more recently, copyright of privately developed material
adopted or incorporated into law.10 The Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (UELMA) will also be introduced as one way for states
to move forward in providing authoritative access to the law without
requiring the use of a private publisher’s product.11 Next, this Note will
discuss the differing legal bases used in that history as a grounding for
discussing the Public.Resource.org litigation.12 The allegations and
arguments at issue in the Public.Resource.org litigation will then be
described.13 Finally, a resolution to that litigation in favor of
Public.Resource.org will be proposed, while recognizing that such an
outcome is unlikely.14
II.

HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT AND “THE LAW”

A. Copyright of Statutes and Judicial Opinions
In the United States, the text of the law has long been
considered to be in the public domain. The issue first reached the
Supreme Court in 1834 in Wheaton v. Peters.15 Though the central
issue of the case centered around who properly held the copyright in
the content of reports of the Supreme Court’s decisions, the Court, at
the very end of the majority opinion, and after disposing of the issues
presented stated, “[i]t may be proper to remark that the court are
unanimously of opinion, that no reporter has or can have any copyright
http://www.law360.com/articles/702797/nonprofit-group-says-georgia-code-can-t-becopyrighted.
7
Compl. at 6, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No.
1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. July 21, 2015).
8
See infra Part II.A.
9
See infra Part II.B.
10
See infra Part II.C.1.
11
See infra Part II.C.2.
12
See infra Part III.A.
13
See infra Part III.B.1.
14
See infra Part III.B.2.
15
See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
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in the written opinions delivered by this court; and that the judges
thereof cannot confer on any reporter any such right.”16
The issue was more squarely confronted by the Court in Banks
v. Manchester.17 A publisher, having received by contracting with the
state of Ohio the exclusive right to publish reports of state court
decisions, sought to prevent another from copying and publishing the
decisions.18 The Court rejected the possibility of copyright in judicial
decisions:
Judges, as is well understood, receive from
the public treasury a stated annual salary, fixed by
law, and can themselves have no pecuniary interest or
proprietorship, as against the public at large, in the
fruits of their judicial labors. This extends to
whatever work they perform in their capacity as
judges, and as well to the statements of cases and
head notes prepared by them as such, as to the
opinions and decisions themselves. The question is
one of public policy, and there has always been a
judicial consensus, from the time of the decision in
the case of Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, that no
copyright could under the statutes passed by
Congress, be secured in the products of the labor
done by judicial officers in the discharge of their
judicial duties. The whole work done by the judges
constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation
16

Id. at 668. Many later opinions and other commentators have described this as the
holding of the case. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 795 (5th
Cir. 2002) (introducing the Wheaton Court’s statement on copyright of judicial opinions
by saying “the Supreme Court interpreted the first federal copyright laws and
unanimously held . . .”); Marvin J. Nodiff, Copyrightability of Works of the Federal and
State Governments Under the 1976 Act, 29 ST. LOUIS L. J. 91, 99 (1984) (“In the historic
case of Wheaton . . . , the Supreme Court held that federal court opinions are in the public
domain.”). However, since the Court’s statement was made after disposing of the case at
hand and was not essential to its decision about the necessity of following the formalities
required by copyright statutes, it must be classified as dictum rather than a holding. See
Irina Y. Dmitrieva, State Ownership of Copyrights in Primary Law Materials, 23
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 81, 84 (2000) (classifying the statement on copyright of the
law as dictum and noting that the Court did not cite any legal authority for its
proposition). The widespread adoption of the statement as a settled legal principle after
Wheaton, however, shows that the principle is not open to dispute, despite its
misunderstood beginning as a mere aside.
17
See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888).
18
Id. at 247–48.
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of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for
publication to all, whether it is a declaration of
unwritten law, or an interpretation of a constitution or
a statute.19
The Banks v. Manchester court referred to a Massachusetts
Supreme Court decision that made a similar public policy
determination:
[J]ustice requires that all should have free access to
the opinions, and that it is against sound public policy
to prevent this, or to suppress and keep from the
earliest knowledge of the public the statutes, or the
decisions and opinions of the Justices. Such opinions
stand, upon principle, on substantially the same
footing as the statutes enacted by the Legislature.20
Soon after these early cases, Congress considered various
proposals and recommendations about specifically excluding both
federal and state judicial opinions, laws, and similar categories of legal
material from being available for copyright. However, many of these
recommendations were not adopted in the Copyright Act of 1909.21 The
1909 Act only provided that “[n]o copyright shall subsist . . . in any
publication of the United States Government,”22 therefore excluding
state and local material and leaving open difficulties with the use of the
word “publication.”23
The current Copyright Act says that “[c]opyright protection
under this title is not available for any work of the United States
Government.”24 This retains the general principle of prohibition of
19

Id. at 253–54 (citing Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 35 (1886)). The Banks v.
Manchester decision also emphasized that copyright could only belong to a citizen or
resident of the United States, so the State did not qualify as an “author” under thencurrent copyright statutes. Id. at 253.
20
Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 35 (1886).
21
Nodiff, supra note 16, at 94–95.
22
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1077 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1946)).
23
See Nodiff, supra note 16, at 94–95 (reviewing the legislative history of the 1909 Act
and finding that “publication” was neither defined in the Act nor clarified by the
legislative history).
24
17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012). Though the current text of § 105 effectively codifies that
material such as federal statutes and judicial opinions is not copyrightable, it does not
shed light on what effect that has on material added to the text of the law itself, such as
annotations or page numbers.
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copyright from the 1909 Act while switching to the concept of “work,”
instead of “publication.”25
Despite the absence of state and local law in the federal statute
excluding government works from copyright protection,26 the common
law principle that the law itself is not copyrightable is firmly
established and has been since the late nineteenth century. Therefore,
the principle that the words of a judicial opinion or statute are in the
public domain would be safe from challenge regardless of whether a
state has a statute parallel to the federal law embodied in § 105.27
B. Copyright of Material Beyond the Text of Statutes and Judicial
Opinions
Although judicial decisions stating that the law is not
copyrightable have been consistent with regard to the text of the law,28
decisions about material beyond the text are more varied.29 However, it
25

See Nodiff, supra note 16, at 94–95 (contrasting the 1909 Act with the 1976 Act, which
used the term “work” instead of “publication” and defined “work of the United States
Government”).
26
State statutes vary greatly in addressing copyright of state government works. See
generally Dmitrieva, supra note 16 (surveying state laws providing for copyright of
primary law materials).
27
As of 2000, according to one study reviewing state statutory provisions related to
copyright of primary legal materials, Illinois was the only state explicitly placing its
statutes in the public domain. Id. at 97. A more recent study reviewed copyright notices
on websites containing such material and found that only Massachusetts specified that it
claimed no copyright in the text of its case law. Glassmeyer, supra note 3, at 20. Of note
to those interested in Georgia’s suit against Public.Resource.org, Georgia is last in
Glassmeyer’s “Openness of Legal Information” rankings. Id. at 34–36; see infra Part
III.B.1.
28
One early case came to an opposite conclusion. See Gould v. Banks, 2 A. 886, 896
(Conn. 1885) (“The judges and the reporter are paid by the state; and the product of their
mental labor is the property of the state . . . . The courts and their records are open to all.
The reasons given by the supreme court . . . constitute no part of the record therein.”).
However, very soon after, another court refused to follow the decision. See State of
Connecticut v. Gould, 34 F. 319, 320 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1888). The Connecticut court then
concluded in 1892 that Gould could not be good law in light of Banks v. Manchester. See
Peck v. Hooker, 23 A. 741, 742 (Conn. 1892).
29
Compare W. Pub. Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1226-27 (8th Cir.
1986) (concluding that West’s arrangement of judicial opinions is the result of
considerable labor, talent, and judgment and thus meets the standard for intellectualcreation), with Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 693, 699 (2d Cir. 1998)
(concluding that since “internal pagination of West's case reporters does not entail even a
modicum of creativity, the volume and page numbers are not original components of
West’s compilations and are not themselves protected by West’s compilation copyright”).
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is generally established that copyright can subsist in elements that are
original and additional to the uncopyrightable text itself, though what
qualifies as original or additional has been contested.
The history of copyright in material beyond the text of the law
stretches back almost as far as the history of the lack of copyright in the
law. In 1851, in Little v. Gould, the court acknowledged that no
copyright existed in the judicial opinions themselves,30 but found that
the state could copyright the volumes of court reports that included
summaries of cases, headnotes, and other material.31
A different court, in Davidson v. Wheelock, reached a parallel
conclusion with regard to state constitutions and statutes, noting that
such materials “are open to the world. They are public records, subject
to inspection by every one.”32 Yet, a compilation or digest of those
records “may be so original as to entitle the author to a copyright on
account of the skill and judgment displayed in the combination and
analysis.”33
Later, that same court relied on Davidson to arrive at the same
conclusion about state court reports34 that Little v. Gould35 had. The
court further expounded on the policy basis for its decision by noting
its importance in a just society:
[I]t is a maxim of universal application that every
man is presumed to know the law, and it would seem
inherent that freedom of access to the laws, or the
official interpretation of those laws, should be coextensive with the sweep of the maxim. Knowledge
is the only just condition of obedience.36
As further justification, the court called attention to the democratic
system of government by describing citizens as “part owner[s]” of the
laws: “[e]ach citizen is a ruler,—a law-maker,—and as such has the
right of access to the laws he joins in making and to any official

30

Little v. Gould, 15 F. Cas. 604, 606 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851).
Id. at 612.
32
27 F. 61, 62 (C.C.D. Minn. 1866).
33
Id.
34
Banks & Bros. v. W. Pub. Co., 27 F. 50, 59 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886).
35
Little v. Gould, 15 F. Cas. 604, 612 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851); see supra notes 30–31 and
accompanying text.
36
Banks & Bros., 27 F. at 57.
31
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interpretation thereof.”37 Several other courts subsequently reiterated
the rule that although no copyright exists in statutes and judicial
opinions, copyright can exist in original compilation and annotation
materials added to those texts.38
Although the precise scope of the availability of copyright in
compilations of and material added to the law has been litigated many
times, the suits generally center on whether the additional material or
method of compilation was sufficiently original or creative to meet
standards of copyrightability.39 These questions, unfortunately, do not
directly shed light on the conflicted status of an annotated code that is
also a state’s official code, which is at the heart of the suit between
Georgia and Public.Resource.org.40
C. Recent Issues: Laws Adopting Text Copyrighted by Private Parties
and the Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act
1.

37

Laws Adopting Text Copyrighted by Private Parties: Veeck

Id. It is interesting to notice that in this section of the opinion, the court does not
provide any legal authority for the stated principles, other than observing that “[t]he laws
of Rome were written on tablets and posted, that all might read, and all were bound to
obedience” and acknowledging that “English courts generally sustain the crown’s
proprietary rights in judicial opinions.” Id.
38
See Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 647–49 (1888); Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129,
138 (6th Cir. 1898); Ex Parte Brown, 78 N.E. 553, 558 (Ind. 1906). Harrison Co. v. Code
Revision Commission, which is especially notable in light of the suit against
Public.Resource.org for copying Georgia’s annotated code, see infra Part III.B, notes that
even if the state had contracted for publication of an annotated version its code, the
contracted publisher did not have an exclusive right to publish the laws since they were
public records. 260 S.E.2d 30, 34 (Ga. 1979). In a related case, the state of Georgia
argued that that it should be able to copyright its statutes so that it could insure accuracy
in any published statutes, but the court rejected this argument and noted that “anyone
citing the [unofficial version] will do so at his peril if there is any inaccuracy in that
publication or any discrepancy between [the official version] and [the unofficial version].
A person takes the same risk, of course, whenever he cites the [unofficial versions of the
United States code]; since both of these codifications are unofficial, the language in the
statutes-at-large (or the official codifications) published by the Government Printing
Office would control.” Georgia v. Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. 110, 114–15 (N.D. Ga.
1982), vacated, 559 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
39
See generally Deborah Tussey, Owning the Law: Intellectual Property Rights in
Primary Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173 (1998).
40
See infra Part III.

358

COPYRIGHT IN THE LAW

[7:350 2016]

What happens when the government adopts copyrighted
material into law through incorporating the copyrighted text into law?
This has been the question in more recent cases in the area of copyright
and the content of the law.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the topic in
dictum when addressing a suit of Building Officials and Code
Administrators (BOCA), a private organization that creates regulations
for building construction.41 The BOCA Code was adopted in
Massachusetts, and then the defendant published its own version of the
State Code without recognition of BOCA’s copyright.42 The court
reviewed the relevant cases43 and found that the differing lines of
reasoning used in these opinions was significant enough to describe in
detail:
BOCA’s argument implies that the rule of Wheaton v.
Peters was based on the public’s property interest in
work produced by legislators and judges, who are, of
course, government employees. This interpretation of
the cases is not without foundation; there is language
in some of them that emphasizes the inconsistency of
private ownership of the law with its creation under
government sponsorship.
But BOCA’s argument overlooks another
aspect of the ownership theory discussed in these
cases. The cases hold that the public owns the law not
just because it usually pays the salaries of those who
draft legislation, but also because, in the language of
Banks v. West, “Each citizen is a ruler,-a law-maker.”
The citizens are the authors of the law, and therefore
its owners . . . .
Along with this metaphorical concept of
citizen authorship, the cases go on to emphasize the
very important and practical policy that citizens must
have free access to the laws which govern them. This

41

Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980).
Id. at 732.
43
See id. at 733–34. Many of the cases cited by the court are discussed previously in this
Note. See supra Parts II.A–B.
42
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policy is, at bottom, based on the concept of due
process.44
This detailed examination of the case law of the
uncopyrightable nature of the law illustrates that, despite the
consistency of the general rule of prohibition of copyright for such
material, the reasoning behind the rule is not agreed upon among legal
authorities.
The status of copyrighted material adopted into law was again
at issue in Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International,
Inc.45 (“SBBCI”). The matter involved an individual who copied and
distributed, via a free website, building codes that had been
incorporated into municipal codes but were originally created by a
private entity that owned the copyright in the codes.46 After receiving a
cease-and-desist letter, Veeck sought a declaratory judgment declaring
that he did not infringe SBCCI’s copyright.47
The court held that privately drafted model codes lose their
copyright protection when adopted by municipal or state
governments.48 The court relied on the Supreme Court precedents in
Wheaton49 and Banks v. Manchester.50 The court additionally relied on
the merger doctrine—that the idea of the specific municipal building
codes at issue can be expressed only through the precise words of the
enacted code, rendering the words of the code uncopyrightable51—and
44

Bldg. Officials & Code Adm., 628 F.2d at 734 (citations omitted). The inconsistent
nature of the reasoning provided by courts in this area means that the law of copyright of
primary legal information is less settled and less predictable than it first appears. See
infra Part III.A.
45
Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert.
denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003). See generally Shubha Ghosh, Copyright As Privatization:
The Case of Model Codes, 78 TUL. L. REV. 653 (2004) (discussing the Veeck case in
detail).
46
Veeck, 293 F.3d at 793–94.
47
Id. at 794.
48
Id. at 800.
49
Id. at 795, 798, 800 (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834)); see supra
notes 15–16 and accompanying text (discussing Wheaton).
50
Veeck, 293 F.3d at 795–800; see supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text (discussing
Banks v. Manchester).
51
Veeck, 293 F.3d at 801. “In some circumstances, . . . a given idea is inseparably tied to
a particular expression. In such instances, rigorously protecting the expression would
confer a monopoly over the idea itself, in contravention of the statutory command. To
prevent that consequence, courts have invoked the merger doctrine.” 4-13 Nimmer on
Copyright § 13.03 (LexisAdvance, 2016). The merger doctrine is usually traced to Baker
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on viewing the content of the codes as facts, which are
uncopyrightable.52 Finally, the court resolved apparent conflicts
between precedents in different circuits by distinguishing between
standards and codes, saying that when standards were found to be
copyrightable, the cases involved private standards that were
incorporated by reference and “were created by private groups for
reasons other than incorporation into law.”53
The future of copyright in content created by private parties
and subsequently incorporated into law is uncertain; one commentator
noted that there is an unresolved circuit split.54 These cases have not
brought much clarity to the field of copyrightability and the law when
the official source of the law includes copyrighted material,55 but they
do suggest that courts deciding such issues need to consider policy
concerns about public access to the law.56
2.

The Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act: Making
Authoritative Versions of the Law Accessible and Able to be
Authenticated

v. Selden. 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879); see also 1-2 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.18
(LexisAdvance, 2016) (discussing Baker and noting that its discussion had drawn
criticism in the scholarly literature).
52
Veeck, 293 F.3d at 801. The touchstone cases for the rule that facts are uncopyrightable
are Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344–45 (U.S.
1991), and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556
(1985).
53
Veeck, 293 F.3d at 805.
54
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking
and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 300–07 (2005) (discussing the
BOCA suit, Veeck, and others, while noting the limitations of the judiciary in addressing
this area).
55
These cases will likely be important in any decisions on the merits in suits involving
Public.Resource.org’s copying of materials incorporating privately developed standards.
See infra Part III.B.2.
56
See Cunningham, supra note 54, at 297–98 (noting that the majority and dissent
decisions in Veeck emphasized different aspects of competing policy objectives and the
need for balancing of public policies in such cases); see generally also Nina A.
Mendelson, Private Control over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory
Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2014) (arguing, in the context of
private standards incorporated into regulatory schemes, that access to the law needs to be
better and easier for reasons beyond public policy concerns, such as that regulatory
beneficiaries need notice of the contents of standards and that the public needs to be able
to invoke mechanisms of accountability, including voting, contacting Congress,
participating in agency procedures, and seeking judicial review).
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Although the law is not copyrightable, it is sometimes only
available in its official57 form through a product that contains additional
copyrightable material, such as a print volume of a court reporter58 or
state statutes59 that includes annotations. Another hurdle to the public
accessing the law is the potential for confusion about whether a
particular version is official, and can be relied on as authoritative, or
not.60
57

“The word ‘official’ means that the text of the statutes is the legal evidence of the law
in a court of law.” NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, OFFICIAL VERSION
OF THE STATE STATUTES/CODE (March–July 2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/lsss/Official_Version_Statutes.pdf.
58
Every volume of West’s National Reporter System is an example of this. See
THOMSON REUTERS, USING WEST’S NATIONAL REPORTER SYSTEM (2010),
http://lscontent.westlaw.com/images/content/nationalreporter10.pdf.
59
Note, for example, that both official and unofficial print versions of Minnesota’s state
code exist. A set of books entitled Minnesota Statutes is published by the Minnesota
Revisor’s office and is an official version. Minnesota Statutes: Official Versions of
Minnesota Statutes, OFFICE OF THE REVISOR OF STATUTES,
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes?view=info (last visited May 14, 2016). Minnesota
Statutes Annotated is published by Thomson Reuters. Minnesota Statutes Annotated,
THOMSON REUTERS, http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/lawproducts/Statutes/Minnesota-Statutes-Annotated-Annotated-Statute--CodeSeries/p/100028621 (last visited May 14, 2016). Minnesota Statutes Annotated is not
listed as an official version of Minnesota Statutes. See Minnesota Statutes: Official
Versions of Minnesota Statutes, OFFICE OF THE REVISOR OF STATUTES,
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes?view=info (last visited May 14, 2016).
60
See CODE OF GEORGIA - FREE PUBLIC ACCESS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/gacode/Default.asp (last visited May 14, 2016). This portal to
Georgia’s code is entitled “Code of Georgia – Free Public Access”; it states that the
“website is maintained by LexisNexis®, the publisher of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated, to provide free public access to the law.” Id. But this language does not make
it clear whether or not this online version is designated as an official version, and so
lawyers needing an official version because they will use the text in legal proceedings
should be wary. See id. This website formerly included language that specified that only
the print version was authoritative, but this author was unable to locate that language;
perhaps it has been removed in light of the litigation described in this Note. See Answer
at 24, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 1:15CV02594 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 14, 2015) (referring to Exhibit F, a screenshot of a previous version of the
portal’s entry page); see also infra Part III.B.1. Once a user clicks the “I Agree” button
and begins to view the material, the beginning search page refers to the material as
“Official Code of Georgia,” but when viewing a specific code section, the heading on the
page only mentions the code’s “official” status through the presence of O.C.G.A.
citations, which are followed by a heading that merely says “Georgia Code.” See CODE
OF GEORGIA - FREE PUBLIC ACCESS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/gacode/Default.asp (last visited May 14, 2016) (noting that the
search page and specific code sections not available via direct link and a user of any of
these pages must begin at this cited portal and accept the Terms & Conditions). The text
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The Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (“UELMA”) is
an attempt to fix these problems by requiring states that adopt such
legislation to provide online versions of legal material that are as
authoritative as the print versions historically relied on.61 “The Act
requires that official electronic legal material be: (1) authenticated, by
providing a method to determine that it is unaltered; (2) preserved,
either in electronic or print form; and (3) accessible, for use by the
public on a permanent basis.”62 The authentication aspect is key; some
states previously offered official versions online, but these versions
were not authenticated and therefore were open to question about their
accuracy.63 The authentication aspect may seem unimportant to the lay
user, but attorneys downloading copies of statutes, or receiving such
downloaded copies from others, and using the documents in legal
proceedings should be able to know, through the authentication
process, that the text on which they are relying is accurate.64

of Georgia’s code does not provide further clarity; the only provision about publishing an
official code is that “[t]he Code Revision Commission shall provide for the publication of
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated . . . .” O.C.G.A. § 28-9-5(a), current through the
2015 Regular Session. This is in contrast to a state like Minnesota, which is more explicit
about how one knows whether a version is authoritative and can be used in legal
proceedings: “Any volume of Minnesota Statutes, supplement to Minnesota Statutes, and
Laws of Minnesota certified by the revisor according to section 3C.11, subdivision 1, is
prima facie evidence of the statutes contained in it in all courts and proceedings.” MINN.
STAT. § 3C.13 (2014).
61
Electronic Legal Material Act: Description, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Electronic+Legal+Material+Act (last visited
May 14, 2016).
62
Id.
63
RICHARD J. MATTHEWS & MARY A. BAISH, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT ON
AUTHENTICATION OF ONLINE LEGAL RESOURCES 3 (Am. Ass’n of Law Libraries
2007)(“A significant number of the state online legal resources are official but none are
authenticated or afford ready authentication by standard methods. State online primary
legal resources are therefore not sufficiently trustworthy.”). Authenticated, and therefore
trustworthy, sources are important for those engaging with the legal system; recall the
warning in Georgia v. Harrison Co. that one citing an unofficial version “[did] so at his
peril if there is any inaccuracy . . . or any discrepancy between [official and unofficial
versions].” 548 F. Supp. 110, 114 (N.D. Ga. 1982) vacated, 559 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Ga.
1983).
64
See, e.g., Document Authentication, OFFICE OF THE REVISOR OF STATUTES,
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/pubs/publish_hash.php?type=statutes&id=3E.02 (last
viewed Jan. 9, 2016) (providing an example of an authentication process in which a user
can upload the document she is using as her source of the law and find out whether it is
an authentic copy).
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UELMA has been adopted in twelve states and has been
introduced in two more.65 UELMA is quite flexible66: states can include
or exclude certain categories of legal information,67 there is no specific
technology designated by the Act, and, though only a unit or employee
of the state government can be the official publisher, states can still
contract with commercial publishers to produce official versions.68
There does not appear to have been any litigation as of yet about
whether or not a state’s implementation properly complies with the
legislation or what ramifications a state’s adoption of UELMA has on
copyright issues.69
Depending on how a state implements UELMA,70 it can avoid
clashes between the interests of private publishers of legal information
and the public with respect to the availability of official versions of the
state’s laws because the public does not have to use a private
65

Electronic Legal Material Act: Description, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Electronic+Legal+Material+Act (last visited
May 14, 2016).
66
See Uniform Electronic Legal Material Act Summary, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Electronic%20Legal%20Material%
20Act (last visited May 14, 2016).
67
Minnesota, for example, includes its Constitution, session laws, codified statutes, and
administrative rules in its adoption of UELMA, but does not include judicial opinions.
See MINN. STAT. 3E.02 (2014).
68
Uniform Electronic Legal Material Act Summary, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Electronic%20Legal%20Material%
20Act (last visited May 14, 2016).
69
This author did not check each statute derived from UELMA in each adopting state for
citing court cases. However, WestlawNext searches by this author on January 28, 2016,
of all state and federal cases for the terms and phrases “UELMA,” “electronic legal
materials act,” and “electronic legal material” did not return any relevant cases; in all
searches but the last phrase, there were no cases.
70
The argument has been made that UELMA may turn out to be ineffective and that
Georgia’s current online statutes could be found to meet UELMA’s requirements of
authentication, preservation, and accessibility. Beth Ford, Note, Open Wide the Gates of
Legal Access, 93 OR. L. REV. 539, 562–63 (2014). However, before concluding that a
state like Georgia has met the Uniform Act’s requirements even without adopting it, a
more detailed analysis would be required, especially on the question of whether
Georgia’s online code is authenticated, since authenticated is different from official, see
supra note 63, and there are not currently any statements or functions related to
authentication on the O.C.G.A. website. See supra note 60 (describing the information
presented to a user of the O.C.G.A. online). However, the fact remains that despite the
promotion of access to legal information through the creation of UELMA and despite its
adoption in some states, there are still significant barriers to access to reliable legal
information, even in states that have adopted UELMA. See GLASSMEYER, supra note 3,
at 1, 3.
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publisher’s product to access version that is both official and
authenticated. Georgia has not adopted UELMA71 and continues to
have a close relationship with a private entity for publication of its
official code,72 so the state has created confusion and issues for itself
and users of its code by outsourcing its publishing and designating an
annotated code as the official version.
III.

THE PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG SUIT: AN OPPORTUNITY TO
SUPPORT PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE LAW

A. Differing Legal Bases of Uncopyrightability of the Law
The history of copyright in the text of statutes, judicial
opinions, and in material added to those texts, along with recent
developments in cases like Veeck and in legislation like UELMA,
shows that copyright of the law is still unsettled territory, even amidst
general consistency about the principle that the law is uncopyrightable.
Another layer of complication is that courts discussing the
uncopyrightability of the law are not entirely consistent in how they
ground that principle,73 making predicting the outcome of suits on the
subject even more difficult than usual.74
Some courts emphasize the fact that the government is like the
employee of the people, and thus the law (and sometimes government
works more generally) belongs to the people under principles
reminiscent of work made for hire.75 A work made for hire exists when
71

Electronic Legal Material Act: Description, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Electronic+Legal+Material+Act (last visited
May 14, 2016).
72
Compl. at 7–8, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No.
1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. July 21, 2015). As discussed below, it is interesting that the state
of Georgia has brought suit to protect the copyright owned by LexisNexis, a private
entity. See infra Part III.B.1.
73
Additionally, some of the early cases that became important precedents in this area, see
supra Parts II.A and II.B, are lacking in any reasoning on which to base their
conclusions. See Davidson v. Wheelock, 27 F. 61, 62 (C.C.D. Minn. 1866); Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
74
An additional consideration is the more fundamental problem, from a constitutional
separation of powers perspective, of judicial branches making public policy judgments,
when “public policy pronouncements are a unique prerogative of the legislative branch.”
Dmitrieva, supra note 16, at 117.
75
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘work made for hire’ is—(1) a work prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or
commissioned for use [in specific categories of works], if the parties expressly agree in a
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an employee who creates a copyrightable work does not own the
copyright; instead, the employer owns it.76 The Court in Banks v.
Manchester calls out this idea, noting that judges are paid out of the
public treasury.77
Other courts focus on public policy, democratic ideals of an
informed populace, and due process concerns that require people to
have access to the laws that govern them, while stating that the law is
not copyrightable and exists in the public domain. The court in Nash v.
Lathrop simply thought that “justice requires” such access.78 In Banks
& Brothers v. West Publishing Co., the court noted the “maxim” that
all are presumed to know the law, so it is only just that all have access
to the law.79 The court also called attention to each citizen’s role as a
“law-maker,” which is the result of a democracy dependent on the
participation of the public.80
Some courts discuss both lines of reasoning and are unclear
about which is the main basis for their holdings. Even in its description
of the relationship between the work product of government officials
and the public, Banks v. Manchester, when it highlighted that the law is
“binding [on] every citizen,” seemed to suggest that due process
principles are at play.81 The cases dealing with privately created codes
adopted into law acknowledge the varying reasonings used in the
relevant precedents but do little to resolve whether one or another is
superior.82

written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire.”); see also 1-5 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.13 (LexisAdvance 2016) (summarizing
the law of copyright and works of the United States government and the work made for
hire concepts involved).
76
See 1-5 NIMMER, supra note 75.
77
Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888); see also supra notes 17–20 and
accompanying text.
78
142 Mass. 29, 35 (1886).
79
27 F. 50, 57 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886); see also supra notes 34 and accompanying text.
80
Banks & Bros. v. W. Pub. Co., 27 F. at 57; see also supra notes 37 and accompanying
text. This statement could also be interpreting as conjuring work made for hire principles,
with the citizen as employer and the government as employee, so it could be argued that
this reasoning fits in the first category. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text
(discussing the use of work made for hire-like principles in cases concerning copyright of
the law).
81
Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253–54 (1888) (citing Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass.
29, 35 (1886)) (noting that the law is “binding on every citizen”).
82
See Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir.
1980); Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 800–05 (5th Cir. 2002) (en
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Of these differing foci of reasoning, the second, emphasizing
democratic ideals and due process principles, is the better one; it
upholds the central importance of having the law in the public domain
in the United States and avoids possible loopholes in the work made for
hire analogy. Grounding the uncopyrightability of the law in due
process and democratic principles means that government units, such as
state legislatures, must consider their official, authoritative versions of
laws as being in the public domain.
The varied reasoning used by courts suggests that the
reasoning is not important. Perhaps courts assume that the principle is
so obvious and, at this point, firmly established that it is not necessary
to carefully identify the legal basis for the proposition. However, the
reasoning used to place the law in the public domain could have
implications for whether or not certain material is determined to be in
the public domain.
For example, if work made for hire principles are used,83 and
judges and legislators are considered employees, and the public are
viewed as employers for works created by government officials in their
official capacities, the public owns the copyright in such works.
However, this reasoning could have unintended limits. A United States
citizen who is not a resident or tax-payer in a particular state might not
be considered as included in the public owning the copyrights to
government works created by that state’s judges and legislators, and
that person, unlike a person who lives in that state, would be infringing
on the copyright of that state if he engaged in infringing conduct.84
Additionally, whether or not a corporation would be included
in “the public” that owns the copyrights could be another source of
problems. If corporations are people for such purposes, in what state do
the corporations participate in the ownership of government works?
Could they claim such ownership in more than one state? Can human
persons who pay taxes in several states do so? Which taxes trigger such
ownership? Many benefits of governments are only given to residents
or other specific members of the public; use of the law could be argued
to be no different.

banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003); see also supra notes 44, 48–53 and
accompanying text (discussing reasoning in Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. and Veeck).
83
See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
84
See Dmitrieva, supra note 16, at 113–14 (arguing that this “metaphorical concept of
citizen authorship” is not the best model and is impractical in the United States of today).
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What happens if the government, the employee of the people,
did not write the law? Is the public’s rightful access to the law lessened
when government representatives only did the work of enacting a
particular law, but did not create it? This is the issue in the BOCA and
Veeck cases, but the answers to these questions still are not clear.85 The
public policy concern shown in these cases could be a justification for
why Georgia should lose its lawsuit86: if the state is designating
material as its official law, even if that material would otherwise be
copyrightable, then it is not subject to copyright, as in Veeck.
All of these issues suggest that the public domain status of
statutes and judicial decisions is more safely maintained by the public
policy and due process reasoning used by the Court in Nash v.
Lathrop87 and like cases.88 That reasoning more reliably promotes
public access of the law and other government information. It also
places the burden on states and other would-be copyright owners, such
as publishers of legal information, to show why denying public domain
status of the law and material associated with the text of the law does
not offend principles of democracy and due process. The alternative is
to place the burden on the public to show why particular material is of
the type of material that the public has a right to have through a work
made for hire relationship with the government.
B. Resolving Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc.
1.

Facts and Allegations of Case.

Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc.89 is
an opportunity for a court to provide greater support of public access to
the law and greater clarity in the reasoning underlying that policy. The
suit highlights the problems and confusion that can arise when a state
offers an official version of its code only through using a private
publisher’s products or services and designates an annotated code as its
official code.

85

See supra Part II.C.2; see also generally Ghosh, supra note 45.
See infra Part III.B.2.
Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 35 (1886).
88
See Banks & Bros. v. W. Pub. Co., 27 F. 50, 57 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886); see also supra
notes 78–90 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning in Nash and Banks).
89
No. 1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. filed July 21, 2015).
86
87
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This is not Public.Resource.org’s first time in court, or its first
time in court over an alleged copyright infringement of legal materials.
The organization has recently been in litigation to obtain Internal
Revenue Service records and to defend against infringement actions
arising out of publishing federal and state regulations online.90
On July 21, 2015, the Code Revision Commission, on behalf
of the State of Georgia, filed suit against Public.Resource.org, claiming
violations of the Copyright Act,91 because of Public.Resource.org’s
“systemic, widespread and unauthorized copying and distribution of the
copyrighted annotations in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated.”92
90

Public.Resource.org v. U. S. Internal Revenue Serv., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1262, 1268 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (granting summary judgment to Public.Resource.org and requiring the
government to produce requested documents); Am. Educ. Research Ass’n, Inc. v.
Public.Resource.org, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 542, 551 (D.D.C. 2015) (striking
Public.Resource.org’s demand for a jury trial in suit for infringement of plaintiffs’
copyright in educational and psychological testing standards incorporated into the Code
of Federal Regulations and state laws; suit is ongoing); Am. Soc’y for Testing &
Materials v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 534, 542 (D.D.C. 2015) (striking
Public.Resource.org’s demand for a jury trial in suit for infringement of plaintiffs’
copyright in safety codes and standards incorporated by state and local governments into
statutes, regulations, and ordinances; suit is ongoing); see also Tim Cushing,
Public.Resource.Org Sued (Again) For Publication Of A Document Incorporated Into
Federal Regulations [Update], TECHDIRT (May 29, 2014, 3:29 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140526/17193727368/publicresourceorg-sued-againpublication-document-incorporated-into-federal-regulations.shtml (discussing the
American Education Research Association suit and providing links to articles about other
Public.Resource.org suits); Victor Li, Who Owns the Law? Technology Reignites the War
Over Just How Public Documents Should Be, ABA J. (Jun. 2014), available at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/who_owns_the_law_technology_reignites_t
he_war_over_just_how_public_document (reviewing the career of Public.Resource.org
founder Carl Malamud and discussing differing viewpoints on Malamud’s tactics and
recent litigation).
91
Compl. at 14, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No.
1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. July 21, 2015) (claiming violations “of one or more of Sections
106, 501–503, and 505 of the Copyright Act”). The Commission had previously sent
Public.Resource.org a “Cease and Desist” letter, id. Exhibit 4, to which
Public.Resource.org responded and stated that it “respectfully reject[ed] the distinction
between ‘the statutory text itself’ and additional materials, as both are integral part and
parcel of the only Official Code of Georgia Annotated, such material constituting the
official law as published by the State.” Id. Exhibit 5.
92
Compl. at 2, Code Revision Commission, No. 1:15CV02594. Note that the content
provided by Public.Resource.org therefore goes beyond what is provided online for free
through the Georgia legislature’s portal to the O.C.G.A., which, despite often using
O.C.G.A. as its title, does not provide any of the annotations, so it is the annotations that
are at the center of this dispute. See sources cited supra note 60. The Complaint specifies
that the Commission does not and could not assert copyright in the statutory text itself.
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Specifically, the Commission alleges that Public.Resource.org has
“copied at least 140 volumes/supplements containing the O.C.G.A.
Copyrighted Annotations” and posted these works “on at least one of
its websites.”93 Further copying was alleged through posting of the
material on another website, to which Public.Resource.org indicated
that it was the owner of the works, resulting in many downloads of the
annotations,94 and through distribution of USB drives containing copies
of the annotations.95 The Commission additionally alleged that
Public.Resource.org has created unauthorized derivative works in a
manner that “encourg[es] the creation of further [such] works.”96 The
Commission is seeking injunctive relief, as well as attorneys’ fees and
costs.97
The Complaint describes Public.Resource.org and its founder,
Carl Malamud, as engaged in “a larger plan designed to challenge the
letter of U.S. copyright law and force government entities . . . to expend
tax payer dollars in creating annotated codes and making those
annotated codes easily accessible.”98
The Commission’s view of the problem is that if the
annotations to its code are freely available online, the publisher,
LexisNexis, will not be able to sell copies of the annotated code,
causing “Georgia [to] be required to either stop publishing the
annotations altogether or pay for development of the annotations using
state tax dollars.”99 In this way, the Commission has framed itself as
the defender of the public, who will eventually lose the annotations as a

Compl. at 8, Code Revision Commission, No. 1:15CV02594. The Complaint further
describes the free online access that is available and states that LexisNexis is required to
publish that resource by the terms of its contract with the State. Id.
93
Id. at 9.
94
Id. at 9–10.
95
Id. at 12–13.
96
Id. at 2, 9.
97
Id. at 16–17.
98
Id. at 10–11; see also Mike Masnick, State Of Georgia Sues Carl Malamud For
Copyright Infringement For Publishing The State’s Own Laws, TECHDIRT (Jul. 24, 2015,
6:10AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150723/17125231743/state-georgia-suescarl-malamud-copyright-infringement-publishing-states-own-laws.shtml (complaint
available for viewing). The Complaint and Exhibits also detail Malamud’s previous
copying of government and legal information. Id. at 11.
99
Compl. at 2–3, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No.
1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. July 21, 2015).
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resource if Public.Resource.org is allowed to continue its posting of
annotations.100
The Complaint specifies that the annotations are only added in
the annotated publication and are not enacted law.101 The Complaint
also details the process of creating the annotations102 and the specifics
of the contractual arrangement between the State of Georgia and
LexisNexis, which include that the annotations and other original
works are works made for hire and the copyright in them is owned by
the Commission.103
Public.Resource.org’s Answer admitted many of the
allegations about what it had done with the annotations in the O.C.G.A.
but denied that the Commission owns a valid copyright in the
annotations104 and further denied “the bizarre, defamatory, and
gratuitous allegation that it has a ‘strategy of terrorism.’”105 The
Answer raised ten affirmative defenses.106 The second defense stated
that the O.C.G.A. is in the public domain and not copyrightable subject
matter and further reiterated Public.Resource.org’s position that the
State “has no copyrights in works that government entities have
enacted as law” and that “[t]he O.C.G.A. including annotations,
regardless of how they were authored, is the law of Georgia, and the
law should be free to the public.”107 The ninth and tenth defenses
directly addressed the Commission’s request for an injunction by
stating that there should be no injunction because of a lack of
irreparable injury and because it would be against the public interest.108
Public.Resource.org went on to counterclaim and seek a
declaratory judgment that its actions do not infringe any copyright.109
The counterclaim outlined Mr. Malamud’s contributions to public

100

See id. at 2–3.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6–7.
103
Id. at 7–8. The state’s ownership of the copyrights explains why the publisher is not
the complaining party in this litigation, as it has been in other cases. See infra Part II.B.
104
See generally, Answer and Counterclaims, Code Revision Commission v.
Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 1:15--2594 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2015).
105
Id. at 7.
106
Id.at 10–11.
107
Id. at 10.
108
Id. at 11.
109
Id. at 12.
101
102
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access to government information,110 as well as the non-profit
contributions of Public.Resource.org.111
The counterclaim also describes language in the O.C.G.A’s
annotations that warned against using a different, unofficial version of
Georgia’s statutes.112 Public.Resource.org then describes the restrictive
conditions of using the online version of the O.C.G.A. and again calls
attention to its unofficial status,113 including providing an exhibit
showing the website portal to the O.C.G.A. with language specifying
that the print version is the authoritative version.114
Public.Resource.org further outlines a view of the law that
relies on authorship by the people and requires public availability under
principles of the rule of law generally, the lack of a defense of
ignorance of the law, and the Constitution’s protections of people
reading and communicating the law.115 Public.Resource.org argues that
Georgia has incorporated the annotations and other material beyond the
legislatively enacted text by incorporating that material in its official
version of the Code, and thus use of that material by others “is lawful
through the doctrine of merger.”116 Additionally, Public.Resource.org
claims that “[e]ven if copyright law protected authorship by private
parties after it is incorporated into law, . . . [its] use of the complete
O.C.G.A. is fair use.”117
The Commission answered the counterclaim118 and filed an
Amended Complaint; the only substantive difference from the first
Complaint is that, at allegation 18, the Commission alleged that
Public.Resource.org
has
“copied
at
least
52
different
volumes/supplements containing the 2015 O.C.G.A. Copyrighted

110

Id. at 14–18.
Id. at 19–21.
112
Id. at 22–23.
113
Id. at 23–24.
114
Id. at 24 (referring to Exhibit F, a screenshot of a previous version of the portal’s entry
page); see also supra note 60.
115
Id. at 25–26.
116
Id. at 26–27; see also supra note 51 (discussing the merger doctrine).
117
Id. at 27. “[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use” four factors will be considered. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
118
Answer to Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, Code Revision Commission v.
Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-2594 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2015).
111
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Annotations” since the initial filing of the suit.119 Public.Resource.org
has filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint incorporating a
response to the new allegation that mirrors its previous assertions of
having done the copying alleged but denying that the material at issue
was protected by copyright.120
There has been no substantive filings beyond the pleadings; as
of this writing, the parties had begun discovery in the midst of filing the
amended pleadings.121
2.

How the Case Should Be Decided

As of March 23, 2016, the parties in Code Revision
Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc. have not yet filed any motions
that would resolve any of the claims, so it is currently unknown exactly
how they will frame their arguments and what legal authorities they
will rely on.122
It seems likely that the Commission will largely rely on cases
that distinguish between the text of the law and supplemental material
and specify that the former is not copyrightable but the latter is.123
Narrowly focusing on and following the cases that hold supplemental
material copyrightable124 has an appealing simplicity and would avoid
sending states that have arrangements like Georgia’s125 scrambling to
119

Amended Complaint, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No.
1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2015).
120
Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, Code Revision Commission v.
Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 22, 2015).
121
See Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 1:15CV02594 (N.D.
Ga.) (including docket entry 12, Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan; entry 13, a
Scheduling Order for discovery to end on March 18, 2016; entries 14 and 15, Certificates
of Service of initial disclosures by each party; and entries 20 through 25, Certificates of
Service by both parties of responses and objections to interrogatories and requests for
production of documents).
122
See Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 1:15CV02594 (N.D.
Ga.).
123
See supra Part II.B.
124
See supra Part II.B.
125
For example, it appears that South Dakota also uses a private publisher for its official
version of its print code. See South Dakota Codified Laws,
LEGALSOLUTIONS.THOMSONREUTERS.COM,
http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/Primary-Law-Materials-CasesCCodes-/South-Dakota-Codified-Laws-Annotated-Statute--Code-Series/p/100001432 (last
visited May 14, 2016) (specifying that the books are published “under an exclusive
contract with the South Dakota Code Commission”). South Dakota does publish its

[7:350 2016] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW REVIEW

373

address the implications of needing to provide versions beyond what
they currently provide and the implications of having contractual
obligations with private publishers that are irreconcilable with the
court’s holding.
In countering the Commission’s precedent-based argument,
Public.Resource.org would likely be successful if it analogized this
litigation to cases holding that material adopted into a code, even if
privately created and otherwise copyrightable, is not copyrightable.126
The most difficult part of the Commission’s argument will be
carefully defining the meaning of the term “official” in light of
Georgia’s code publication arrangements and addressing the
implications of the State of Georgia having designated an annotated
version as its official version.
To highlight the importance of the meaning of “official” and
to offer its own appealingly simple conclusion, Public.Resource.org
will likely argue that designating a version of a legal code as “official”
encompasses the entirety of that version, thus putting it into the public
domain. Further, Public.Resource.org may try to draw attention to the
uncomfortable position that the Commission is inescapably supporting:
that the onus is on a reader of the O.C.G.A. to differentiate between
which bits of text are official and uncopyrightable and which are not
official and are copyrightable. This position gives a bad taste in a
country where the law is not copyrightable, which may cause a judge or
jury to be very hesitant to accept the Commission’s position.
Yet, from a broader perspective of anticipating similar issues
in the future, Public.Resource.org would benefit more from
concentrating on convincing a judge or jury to take a broader view of
the case and focus on the reasoning behind the uncopyrightability of the
law. This could be a difficult path if the judge is not receptive to public
policy arguments, but Public.Resource.org may have an easier time
statutes online, but it is unclear from the website whether or not it is an official version.
See Codified Laws, SOUTH DAKOTA LEGISLATURE LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COUNCIL,
http://legis.sd.gov/statutes/Codified_Laws/ (last visited May 14, 2016). Chapter 2-16,
“Codes and Compilations,” of South Dakota Codified Laws does not appear to provide
for the online publication of its code. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 2-16-3 et seq. (West,
WestlawNext through 2015 Regular Session). See also Statutes/Code: Publisher and
Frequency of Printing, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jul. 2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/lsss/Publisher_Printed_Statutes.pdf (listing publishers of
each state’s printed code: legislature, state, revisor, Lexis/Nexis, and/or Thompson [sic]
Reuters (West)).
126
See supra Part II.B.1.
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bringing in such arguments because arguments about public policy and
democratic ideals have previously influenced decisions about copyright
and the law.127
Even a judge not otherwise responsive to public policy
arguments could reach a result that takes the various public policy
concerns into account because the BOCA case and Veeck both
discussed and placed significant importance in these arguments.
Although those cases are not in the same federal appellate circuit as
Georgia,128 they have persuasive value both as cases decided in federal
appellate courts and as issues that involved the intersection of copyright
of material created by a private entity and copyright of the law.
Public.Resource.org
should
additionally
attack
the
Commission’s description of the way it and the public will be harmed if
Public.Resource.org is allowed to continue; the Commission’s pleading
that it needs to prevail because otherwise it will have to stop publishing
annotations or spend taxpayer money to do so is strange when the
annotations are not freely available to the public anyway. Though
details of the contract between the State of Georgia and LexisNexis
have not been publicly disclosed in the litigation, it seems that
LexisNexis is already recouping the costs of creating the annotations
and other supplemental material by selling print and online copies of
the (actually annotated, unlike the free online version) O.C.G.A.; even
if LexisNexis doesn’t retain ownership of that material under the
contract, it is still profiting from producing it.
The necessity that the Commission is claiming becomes more
dubious in light of the publishing practices of some other states.
Consider Minnesota, where a private publisher creates and sells an
annotated version of the statutes129 while the State publishes an official
version both in print130 and online,131 without any copyrighted material
127

See supra Part III.A.
Georgia is in the 11th Circuit. Court Role and Structure, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure (last visited May
14, 2016).
129
Minnesota Statutes Annotated, LEGALSOLUTIONS.THOMSONREUTERS.COM,
http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/Statutes/Minnesota-StatutesAnnotated-Annotated-Statute--Code-Series/p/100028621 (last visited May 14, 2016)
(stating the retail cost as $8,323.00).
130
Statutes-2014 Full Set, MINNESOTA’S BOOKSTORE,
http://www.comm.media.state.mn.us/
bookstore/mnbookstore.asp?page=viewbook&BookID=81734&stocknum=14347&CatId
=280 (last visited May 14, 2016) (stating the retail cost as $255). The State of Minnesota
specifies that this is one of two official versions. About Statutes, OFFICE OF THE REVISOR
128
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confusingly mixed in. Either way, the public does not have free access
to the annotations, but in the case of Minnesota, the public does have
access to an official version.
Despite
the
various
arguments
available
to
Public.Resource.org, it seems likely that, should the litigation proceed
to judgment, the Commission will prevail and the matter will result in a
decision with a narrow scope based on applying cases that hold
supplemental material copyrightable.132 Public.Resource.org has
demanded a jury trial,133 and it is possible that public policy arguments
about what ordinary citizens should be able to expect when seeking
legal information might resonate with a jury, but if the judge thinks that
the law compels a resolution in the Commission’s favor, jury-friendly
arguments may not be enough. A judge, even if sympathetic to public
policy arguments and larger implications of democratic and
constitutional principles, may find the thrust of precedent inescapable
and may prefer to leave the policy determinations to appellate courts
and legislatures.
Even if the matter is resolved in Public.Resource.org’s favor,
it would remain to be seen whether the court would use reasoning that
focuses on the idea of governments as creating works made for hire,
with the people as the owner of the law, or on broader democratic
ideals of an informed populace and due process requiring that people
have access to the laws that govern them. The latter would be the better
reasoning because it would be based on foundational democratic and
constitutional principles and it would not leave the uncopyrightability
of the law open to new creative attacks.134 This case should be seen not
as a run-of-the-mill copyright infringement case but as an important
challenge to the scope of the principle of the people as the source of
government and law.

OF STATUTES,

https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/statutes/?view=info (last visited May
14, 2016).
131
2015 Minnesota Statutes, OFFICE OF THE REVISOR OF STATUTES,
https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/statutes/ (last visited May 14, 2016). The State of
Minnesota specifies that this is one of two official versions. About Statutes, OFFICE OF
THE REVISOR OF STATUTES, https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/statutes/?view=info (last
visited May 14, 2016).
132
See supra Part II.B.
133
Answer at 1, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No.
1:15CV02594 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2015).
134
See supra Part III.B.2.
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In addition, a finding for Public.Resource.org could push
states like Georgia135 to change publishing practices in ways that would
avoid suits like this in the future. Until Georgia creates an official,
authenticated version of its code that is accessible to the public,
preferably online pursuant to a UELMA-based law, it cannot claim that
the annotated code at issue in this case is protected by copyright. As the
official version of the state’s code, it is in the public domain, even
though it contains additional material that might otherwise be
copyrightable. Georgia is not complying with the due process and
democratic public policy concerns underlying the principle of the law
as in the public domain. This is an unnecessary situation in today’s
world, where websites are commonplace and some states have shown
that it’s possible to provide this information without relying on private
publishers who have competing interests.136
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is generally settled that the law is not subject to copyright,
and yet, even in a time of proliferation of governmental and legal
material online, provided directly by governmental bodies, copyright is
used by governments and private entities to restrict access to the law.
This is an access-to-justice issue that can be solved with little fuss;
many state governments have already done so by adopting UELMA
and putting official, authenticated primary law online. This means that
an organization like Public.Resource.org would have no reason to copy
the material, and if it did copy the material, it would not be subject to
an infringement action.
The Public.Resource.org case illustrates the ongoing issues in
this area. The case ought to come out in favor of Public.Resource.org
because the public policy principles of democracy and due process
behind exclusion of the law from copyright protection are extremely
important, and the State of Georgia is pushing against such policies by
continuing to publish its official code as it does. However, it seems
135

See generally GLASSMEYER, supra note 3 (surveying the state of access to state
primary legal material).
136
See supra note 59 (describing the availability of official and unofficial Minnesota
statutes in print), 130–31 (describing the availability of official Minnesota legal
information in print and online, without the involvement of a private entity); see also,
GLASSMEYER, supra note 3, at 6 (finding that most, yet not all, of the reviewed online
versions of the law were unofficial).
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likely that the court will follow precedents holding that annotations to
primary legal material are copyrightable and so find that
Public.Resource.org is infringing by copying and distributing them.
Such a decision would be to the detriment of the public, which needs to
have reliable access to accurate versions of the laws that govern it. To
have otherwise flies in the face of ideals of democracy and due process.

